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In the face of populist nationalism, European institutions
must do more online to increase awareness of the common
dimensions of the eurocrisis.
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Across Europe, many politicians are increasingly using a populist, anti-European rhetoric to
gain support, at the same time that European institutions are pushing to establish a sense of
European community. By combining content analysis of the European Parliament and
Commission’s online communications with staff interviews, Johannes Hillje finds that only
a very small percentage of communications relate to the eurozone crisis or use European
identity markers. He argues that European institutions can no longer afford to leave the
debate on the crisis and future of Europe to others, and must work harder to promote a
European identity.
In the light of  bailout packages and stability mechanisms that require f inancial contributions of  all euro
countries, in the present crisis the European Union (EU) arguably needs the greatest deal of  ‘solidarity
amongst strangers’ in its history. In the absence of  a European-wide public discourse, however, national
considerations and discriminations against other member states dominate national discourses. With
headlines such as ‘The Fraudsters of  the Peloponnese’, Germany’s inf luential tabloid Bild Zeitung has
f ramed the Greek people as lazy and corrupt in recent years. Meanwhile, Greek and Italian media portray
German chancellor Angela Merkel as the new ‘European dictator ’ imposing the ‘Fourth Reich’ in the f orm
of  obsessive austerity measures. Moreover, national leaders engaged in this insult ing discourse creating
‘internal others’ within Europe. David Cameron has ref erred to ‘countries in other parts of  Europe that
live beyond their means’ and considered violating EU treaties by halt ing immigration of  Greeks into the
UK. This sort of  discourse has made the eurozone crisis much more than an economic crisis; it has also
become a European identity crisis. As a pan-European perspective f alls by the wayside, national
concerns outdo the European ideal that everyone was in the project together. Instead of  a European
‘we’, the dominant narratives seem to be composed of  ‘us, the nation’ and ‘them, the other EU member
states’. Thus, to say it with Benedict Anderson, Europe lacks the discursive material that allows
Europeans to imagine the European community.
In their latest communication strategies, EU
institutions have pointed out that they want
to go beyond the mere dissemination of  EU
news and stimulate a sense of  European
community. With a f ocus on social media
such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube,
the European Parliament (EP) has
endeavoured to f oster ‘the development of
a sense of  shared public interest
throughout the EU’. In the same vein, the
European Commission (EC) declares in its
Internet strategy that it uses these
platf orms to ‘help create a sense of
European community’. When almost all we
now hear about Europe – despite a Nobel
Peace Prize – is crisis, the time seems to be
right to put these words into practice and
use social media to address cit izens without relying on of ten unloved national media outlets. As part of
my master ’s dissertation at the LSE, I examined to what extent the EC and EP have counterbalanced re-
nationalising trends and promoted a European identity during the crisis through social media. Using
content analysis, I looked at 504 messages published by the EP and EC on their Facebook channels
around the most crit ical events of  the eurozone crisis between November 2010 and January 2012 such
as the second bailout f or Greece.
Two f indings stand out: First, both EU institutions do not pay much attention to the crisis in their
Facebook communication. Only 4.5% of  the EC’s posts and 9.8% of  the EP’s messages published when
the crisis was most salient actually deal with the crisis. Second, European identity markers in the f orm of
‘we’, ‘us’ or ‘our ’ standing f or ‘the Europeans’ occur only in a minority of  the posts. While the EP uses this
European ‘we’-perspective in 6.3% of  its posts, the EC deploys it a bit more regularly – in 15.5% of  its
posts. Further analysis shows that the low usage cannot be explained by the EP’s and EC’s general
writ ing style on Facebook, because terms like ‘we’ and ‘us’ are f requently used, but they ref er to other
groups such as the ‘we, the institution’ or ‘we, the communications staf f ’ (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Ref erence groups of  ‘we-perspectives’ employed in the EP’s (lef t) and EC’s (right) posts.
In order to contextualise the f indings of  the content analysis, I also conducted interviews with staf f
members of  the EP’s and EC’s web communications units. The interviews revealed that the low number
of  messages dealing with the crisis is due to the perception that the issue is too technical f or the
Facebook audience. To some extent the communications staf f  also lack knowledge about details of  the
EU’s crisis measures and thus ref rain f rom writ ing about it. The reserved European identity promotion
was explained dif f erently by the interviewees f rom the EC and EP: While the EP aims to ref lect the
parliament’s plurality (including eurosceptical voices) and rather f ocus on f acilitating debate on current
issues, the EC doubts that people would respond to European identity markers as most Europeans were
only thinking in national terms.
Keeping in mind the hostile discourse observed in national media, two points seem to be worth
considering in regard to these f indings: First, leaving the debate on the crisis and the f uture of  Europe to
others is not an answer. The EC and EP have and use the interactive tools that social media of f er, but
they do it too litt le on the most salient European issue. Messages and debates must not be about
technical details of  crisis measures, but they should increase the awareness of  the common dimension
of  the crisis and the consequences of  a f ailure of  the project in order to balance the increasing number
of  populist voices in the member states. Second, assuming that Europeans lack a European sense is
disproved by survey data. In 2010, 74% of  European cit izens f elt ‘European’ – 3% more than in 2008.
Identity development should not be seen as a zero-sum game; a European identity may well exist as an
addition to national identit ies. Thus, the chance of  reinf orcing or reawakening a European ‘we’ seems to
be greater than the risk of  negative responses when promoting a European identity.
Fostering debate among Europeans – in other words a European public sphere – is truly a good
intention, but one needs to make sure that European issues are perceived and discussed as common
issues. In other words, it is not enough to make a French person and a Pole talk to one another; there
must be also a ‘we-f eeling’ between them based on the acknowledgment of  being part of  one
transnational polity that imposes regulative policies af f ecting both of  them.
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